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Abstract
Cultural diversity is the norm in Australia and the United Kingdom. Both states
celebrate multiculturalism. But some populist politicians, commentators, and
quasi-academics have recently portrayed Western Muslims as a “fifth column”,
organized and intent on destroying the fabric of Western culture from within. Inter-
estingly, extremist Muslim groups in the West make similar claims about the
relationship between Islam and the West. In recent years, however, Western-born
“moderate” Muslim intellectuals and moderates have emerged into the public
sphere to challenge essentialist depictions of Islam and the Islamist textual interpret-
ations. They claim an important social space for the Western practice of Islam.
Whilst a burgeoning level of academic scrutiny is being focused upon moderate
Muslims, this article notes the absence of academic literature about a large part of
the Muslim population whose public life is not necessarily guided by their religion
but more by their culture and ethnicity, i.e. the “cultural Muslims”. This group is
unrepresented in the public debate on Islam and often ignored yet could constitute
the majority of Western Muslims. This article concludes by posing significant ques-
tions about this group and the implications of political discourse upon their future
trajectory.
Introduction
Where doMuslims fit in Western secular societies? Do they belong to the West? Can they
function and flourish in a system that is guided by Judeo-Christian values? These ques-
tions and other permutations have given rise to a large body of literature that is
broadly divided into two camps: the proponents and the detractors of Islam/West com-
patibility. The proponents generally highlight the positive engagement of Muslim com-
munity groups with the broader society and refer to attempts at inter-faith dialogue as
evidence of compatibility; i.e. we speak the same language. Proponents of Islam/West
compatibility that could range from Islamic community organizations to Western scho-
lars, accuse the detractors of prejudice and the selective reading of the Holy Book. Refer-
ences to violence and subjugation of non-Muslims they argue refers to a certain historical
period and needs to be understood within its appropriate context. This type of literature
constitutes a substantial body and is generally endorsed by government agencies keen to
promote social cohesion. The detractors on the other hand present Islam as an eternal
and unchanging religion and argue that Muslims are (or should be) bound by the
limits and framework set in the Holy Book. In this body of work, proponents of Islam/
West compatibility are presented as either naive or misinformed about the nature of
Islam or deliberately deceitful. Two very different groups contribute to this approach.
Commentators overcome by Islamophobia insist that Islam is irredeemable and
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represents a value system based on pre-modern and patriarchal traditions; whilst Isla-
mists advocate the constitution of what they claim to be a pure and un-adulterated
Islamic identity, not tainted by modern notions of freedom or gender-equality.
Proponents and detractors argue about the relevance and meaning of the holy text.
Each insists that the other interpretation of the text is wrong. They claim ownership of
the meaning of the text because they see the text as instrumental in governing behavior.
In this paradigm religious text has a direct bearing on the political and social attitude and
behavior of Muslims. This is obviously very different from how the behavior of the
Christian population is explained. It is not customary to refer to the Bible to explain
the political and social behavior of Christians. This obvious gap in the literature affects
a large part of the Muslim population whose public life is not necessarily governed by
their religion. This group is unrepresented in the public debate on Islam and often
ignored. But this is a relatively recent problem as the West has become more and more
concerned with security implications of Islam.
Earlier Muslim settlement in Australia and the United Kingdom did not inspire the
level of scrutiny and debate it inspires today. This was largely because migrants were gen-
erally classified by their ethnicity, rather than religion. Ethnicity was regarded as the
primary source of identity and the policy of multiculturalism was designed to accommo-
date that while tying the many ethnic groups to the broader national identity. Multicul-
turalism in both the UK and Australia were social engineering mechanisms aimed at
promoting civil citizenship and allowing the articulation of ethnic peculiarities within
the framework of the nation. The most favored articulation of the policy has been
“unity in diversity”. The advent of the War on Terror, however, has spurred Islamic
organizations into action, giving the policy of multiculturalism greater significance. Uti-
lizing the space provided by this policy, Islamic community groups have sought to
mobilize and assert their collective, this time religious identity while reiterating their
loyalty to the state.
The present paper offers an account of the ways that multiculturalism is viewed by
Islamic and Islamist groups and highlights the common ground between Islamophobic
commentators and Islamists. It seeks to sketch an outline of the “moderate” approach
and concludes with some observations regarding the missing link in the literature on
Islam and Muslim communities.
The Extreme Right and the “Fifth Column”
The concept of the “fifth column” emerged from the Spanish civil war when nationalist
General Emilio Mola leading four columns of soldiers towardsMadrid famously declared
he had a “fifth column” inside the city that would join the invaders when they entered the
capital. The Oxford English Dictionary thus defines a “fifth columnist” loosely as a
“traitor, a spy”.1 In recent years, a great deal of literature has been published in
Western nations that has sought to portray Western Muslims as a “fifth column”—that
is, as an “enemy within”, collectively seeking to destabilize Western nations’ identity
and values for the benefit of an international Islamic movement intent on the establish-
ment of a caliphate.
In recent years a vast array of alarmist literature has emerged from extremist right wing
authors backed by conservative think tanks, publishers, and organizations. In Britain and
Europe titles of these works include Bruce Thornton’s “Decline and Fall: Europe’s Slow
Motion Suicide”,2 Bruce Bawer’s “While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying
the West from Within”3 and “Surrender: Appeasing Islam, Sacrificing Freedom”,4 Melanie
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Phillips’ “Londonistan”,5 and perhaps most infamously, Bat Ye’or’s “Eurabia: The Euro-
Arab Axis”.6 In Australia similar right wing literature has emerged, with less distribution,
though no less vigor in its zealous mission. Titles includeMark Durie’s “The Third Choice:
Islam, Dhimmitude and Freedom”7 (with a foreword by Bat Ye’or) and “Liberty to the Cap-
tives: Freedom from Islam and Dhimmitude through the Cross”8 (a companion to The Third
Choice for those seeking to secure “spiritual freedom from the legacy of Islam”)9 and
Vickie Janson’s “Ideological Jihad: Come, Mr Aly, Let Us Reason Together”.10 The
general consensus amongst these authors and those behind them is that the West has
become weak and submissive and that cultural warfare is needed. Their role is to
awaken the West before it is too late, exposing the shortcomings of pluralism, multicul-
turalism and tolerance that have allowed this threat from within to flourish. Bat Ye’or
notes what she considers
Europe’s evolution from a Judeo-Christian civilisation, with important post-
Enlightenment secular elements into a post Judeo-Christian civilisation that is
subservient to the ideology of jihad and the Islamic powers that propagate it.11
Critiques of Multiculturalism from the Right
A key theme pervading far right wing literature has been the critique of multiculturalism
as a system that grants immigrant communities privileges not available to the wider com-
munity and which hence undermines dominant social structures. Indeed as Tariq
Modood has noted even before the attacks of 9/11 and 7/7 there existed “a widespread
perception that Muslims are making politically exceptional, culturally unreasonable or
theologically alien demands upon European states”.12 Bhikhu Parekh caricatures this
sentiment about European Muslims:
They show no commitment to its democratic institutions and mock its liberal
freedoms. They do not feel at home in European societies and prefer to live
among themselves, forming a relatively self contained community maintaining
only the minimum necessary ties with the wider society. They keep making
unreasonable demands and feel deeply resentful and alienated when these are
not met…13
The US-based author Bruce Thornton asserts such sentiment in relation to Europe:
Because of multiculturalism…Muslim immigrants have been allowed to perpe-
tuate their cultures no matter how alien to the values of Western Civilisation
even as the European nations make it difficult for those who do wish to assim-
ilate. Immigrant communities are allowed to create their own standards of be-
haviour, educational curricula, social mores, and public practices, indulgences
not allowed native-born citizens of the host countries.14
Bruce Bawer asserts that “Multiculturalism… teaches free people to belittle their own lib-
erties while bending their knees to tyrants”,15 Australian Anglican Pastor Mark Durie
states in his book (shortlisted for the 2010 Christian Book of the Year) that “…some
Muslims can be extremely aggressive and confrontational in pressing for their rights,
and yet take offense when non-Muslims insist on theirs”.16 These critics assert that multi-
culturalism allowsMuslims to undermine normative social structures and moral values in
order to create the conditions for Islam to forcibly assert control of non-Muslims through
the paradigm of “Dhimmitude”.17
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It is important to note that the criticisms of multiculturalism have also come from pro-
minent academics, including Gilles Kepel of the prestigious Sciences Po in France. Kepel
subscribes to the concept of “Londonistan”, arguing that Britain’s policy of sheltering
radicals in exchange for security contributed to the spreading of radical extremist dis-
course, particularly amongst young British Muslims who did not have a national identity
(despite their British citizenship). Kepel asserts that “the intellectual bedrock” permitting
“Londonistan” was multiculturalism.18 Kepel asserts that multiculturalism “regards
what differentiates religious and ethnic communities as essential, and… sees what
unifies citizens of the same society—beyond race or faith—as of secondary impor-
tance”.19 Kepel argues that the 7/7 bombers in London were the “children of Britain’s
own Multicultural society” who had no allegiance to any Muslim leaders “co-opted”
by the establishment.20 Kepel’s attack continues:
Multiculturalism, after all, makes sense only if it leads to a peaceful society,
where community leaders keep their “flocks” in check and instil in their fol-
lowers religious and moral values conducive to the maintenance of public
order. In Britain it has now failed in this role.21
Kepel’s argument may be simplistic insofar as it views multiculturalism as a static, inflex-
ible concept whereby different communities are strictly segregated along religious or
ethnic lines with no cross-pollination of ideas and cultures through cross-cultural
mixing and the development of professional and personal friendships and relationships.
This critique may, however, be considered far more sophisticated and to have a signifi-
cantly greater intellectual merit than the chorus of extreme right wing quasi-intellectuals
employing empty rhetoric and seeking maximum shock value.
Islamophobia: Grounded in the “New Cultural Racism”
Anti-Muslim sentiment and fear does not emerge in isolation. It is grounded in a fear of
the “other”, including stereotypes and caricatures that have been attached to other
migrant groups before the arrival of Muslims into Western societies. Prior to the
current wave of anti-Muslim sentiment that has come to characterize mainstream politi-
cal debate, racism based upon fear was directed towards other groups perceived to be
undermining the privileges and lifestyle of the host country. In Australia, Southern Eur-
opeans and Asians have been subjected to considerable hostility, whilst in the UK, South
Asians were targeted. This racism has been primarily based on racial, biological attributes
(color) whereas contemporary Islamophobia is not. It is important to consider the
phenomenon whereby a highly diverse group of people comprising different national,
ethnic, and racial origins has been homogenized in the public imagination, and are con-
sidered a distinct block, if not (as the far right seek to portray) a force, determined to
undermine Western liberal democracies.
In the Australian context Kevin Dunn, et al., argue that there exists a “conceptual and
political clarity in positioning anti-Islamic sentiment and actions as a contemporary form
of racialisation”,22 distinguishing between “old” biological racism and “new” racism
based on cultural discrimination. In Britain Tariq Modood distinguishes between
“color” and “cultural” racism, asserting that cultural racism is based on the notion
that culture is “quasi-natural…”23 and that “cultural racism naturalises culture… as if
culture is automatically reproduced, it does not change over time”.24 Writing from a
Canadian multicultural perspective Augie Fleras asserts the existence of “racism
without race” that “transcends biological dominance or different physical endowment…
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advocated instead is a belief in superiority and normalcy of the dominant culture dis-
creetly encoded around the language of citizenship, patriotism and heritage”.25
The belief in cultural supremacy allowed conservative Australian Government Minis-
ters in recent years to tell Muslims to “respect Aussie values or clear off”26 and to make
(albeit highly illogical) comparisons between wearing the hijab and Nazi Germany.27
Conservative British Prime Minister David Cameron has previously argued that policies
of Multiculturalism have failed because “young people feel more separated from
Britain”28 than their parents did and has decried the translation of public documents
into languages other than English.29 In the Netherlands potential immigrants have
been forced to watch videos of topless women and homosexuals kissing as part of their
application process;30 ostensibly as part of an effort to expose them to “Dutch values”;
whilst in Austria, until recently a comparatively more benign and tolerant society
towards Muslims, Islamophobia has emerged as an increasingly important factor in the
political landscape.31 The emergence of new cultural racism in mainstream discourse
and the reassertion of a dominant cultural “essence” by conservative political figures
across multicultural societies has provided a foundation and level of apparent legitimacy
for more extreme perspectives to emerge.
Islamism
The alarmist commentary on the threat of Islam to the West and the follies of multicul-
turalism in allowing the construction and consolidation of anti-Western pockets deep
inside the West have been matched by an equally paranoid perspective—this one
espoused by Islamists. Just as Islamophobic literature paints Muslims as a threat to the
Judeo-Christian value system in the West, epitomized in the Australian Prime Minister’s
accusation of Muslim behaviour as “un-Australian”, Islamist groups view the Western
model of government and the policy of multiculturalism as detrimental to Muslim iden-
tity and Islam. This position is advocated most vigorously by Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). A
trans-national organization with active branches in Europe, Australia, and Central and
South East Asia, Hizb ut-Tahrir has claimed the helm in the Islamist challenge to the
West. Kylie Baxter notes the background to this organization:
Hizb al-Tahrir identifies itself as initially adhering to the dual aim of conveying
the Islamic message to the world and purifying the existing Muslim community.
Ideally both these aims can best be achieved under the agency of an Islamic
state, premised on the Shariah and conducted in line with the historic experi-
ence of the caliphate.32
This challenge is based on a monolithic view of the world that divides good and evil with
surgical precision, allowing no room for doubt or areas of grey. This is best encapsulated
in the concept of “truth” as exclusive, unadulterated and eternal. For HT “truth” sets
Muslims apart from the rest of the world. An HT 2010 essay entitled “Extremism and
Moderation: Between Basic Islamic Conception and Expedient Western Usage” states:
Islam is a complete way of life which provides guidance for man in all aspects of
life. It is not defined in contradistinction to other ideologies or religions, but by
being the truth revealed by the creator of man, life and the universe.33
Within this conception there is only one way of life and one truth based upon the HT
interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah. The catch phrase “Islam is the solution” res-
onates with HT as it dismisses “man-made” systems of government as illegitimate and
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unworthy of Muslim allegiance. Indeed HT takes its exclusive claim to truth further and
presents democracy and multiculturalism as a ploy to weaken the faith, remove Muslims
from the truth and subdue them. According to Hizb ut-Tahrir: “Since the ruling in the
West is on the basis of Kufr andHaraam, then the parliament undertakes actions of legis-
lation without referring to Allah, i.e. it undertakes actions of kufr and sin”.34
HT strongly discourages participation in political elections and rejects change through
formal political mechanisms because this cannot take place except by “being based on
Western thoughts of secularism and capitalism and according to the existing consti-
tutions and laws of the country”.35 Indeed British HT member Burhan Hanif speaking
at the 2010 Sydney conference stated “we must not use concepts such as freedom to
seek our rights”.36 HT’s criticism ofWestern democratic systems extends directly to mul-
ticulturalism and those Muslims working within the state system to achieve change. In a
pamphlet released for the 2010 British general elections the organization states:
If Muslims surrendered to these calls to assimilate into the system we would
inevitably lose our distinct Islamic values… The hopeless track record of the
current MuslimMPs is clear proof of how they must abandon our communities
and Islamic values to remain within those parties. The path of voting for, and
participating in, these secular parties will no doubt bring harm rather than
any good to our community.37
In an October 2009 interview, the chairman of the British Hizb ut-Tahrir executive com-
mittee Abdul Wahid stated with reference to organizations such as the Quilliam Foun-
dation established to prevent extremism that “the government’s long-term objective is
to manufacture a compliant, subdued, secular Muslim community in Britain”.38 Under-
lying this approach is the notion that Islam and theWest are fundamentally incompatible.
Treatises published on the HT website, for example, employ the same demagogic pos-
tures that characterize their extreme right opponents. It is ironic that HT shares so
much with Islamophobic groups as both reject multiculturalism and the promotion of
ethnic and religious diversity as a challenge to this core identity and value systems.
For HT the West and its system of government poses an existential threat to Islam,
just as Islamophobes dismiss the tolerance of Islam as putting the Western way of life
at risk.
In response to the above polarized perspectives many Muslim organizations have
sought to provide an alternative point of view. The following discussion draws upon
research conducted with senior representatives of the Muslim Council of Britain
(MCB) and Islamic Council of Victoria (ICV)—Australia. These are two key examples
of Western Muslim organizations committed to pluralism and multiculturalism,
seeking to act as interlocutors for mainstream Muslim populations in the Western
context.
The Muslim Council of Britain
The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) was inaugurated in 1997 with a membership of
more than 250 British Muslim organizations and now has over 500 affiliated members.
With more than 1.6 million Muslims in Britain (approximately 3% of the total popu-
lation)39 the council is the largest representative body. The MCB pledges to “work for
the common good of society as a whole; encouraging individual Muslims and Muslim
organizations to play a full and participatory role in public life”.40 Muhammad Abdul
Bari, the Secretary General of the MCB stated:
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In my view the moral and ethical principles of our faith urge us to become con-
scientious, responsible citizens and active participants in the life of our nation.
British Muslim interests are British interests and their concerns are no different
from our fellow Britons. As citizens we have shared values that transcend all
boundaries.41
Britain has a longer history of accommodating Muslim migrants than does Australia.
Muslim immigration commenced in earnest following WWII and intensified following
the partition of India–Pakistan. As members of the Commonwealth many South
Asians found it relatively easy to move to Britain. As the chain migration of families gath-
ered pace, Britain became home to a vibrant South Asian community, a majority of whom
wereMuslim. As of the last British census of 2001 over 1.1 million AsianMuslims lived in
the UK, constituting almost 75% of Muslims in that country.42 Pakistani Muslims alone
make up over 42% of British Muslims.43 In 2009 Richard Kerbaj44 from the Times news-
paper wrote an article quoting statistics obtained from the Office for national Statistics
that placed the number of Muslims in Britain at over 2.4 million.45 Asian Muslims
have had to contend with racism but the central question of loyalty to Britain became
the predominant feature of public discourse at the time of the Rushdie Affair. During
the 1989 backlash against Salman Rushdie’s book, “Satanic Verses”, Muslims for the
first time sought to assert their right as a community to protection from perceived blas-
phemy. Muslims questioned why Christianity alone was protected by blasphemy laws
and in so doing highlighted the inherent tension in multiculturalism between active asser-
tion of rights by a minority group and demands for loyalty to the dominant national iden-
tity. This tension would lead those on the far right of politics to criticize multiculturalism
for granting special privileges to minorities whilst hardline Islamists argued the unaccept-
ability of subordinating a religious identity to the dominant national group.46
ForMuhammadAbdul Bari, however, Britishmulticulturalism is not about segregation
andparallel lives, but integration of diverse people.He claims the policy has been a success,
enabling British Muslims to practice their religion whilst contributing to the nation:
The secret of its success is, it not only tolerates but goes further to promote
respect of all cultures and values cultural diversity. Multiculturalism, to us,
does not mean people living parallel lives but provides the opportunity of an
inclusive national identity while placing an equal responsibility on all of us to
be citizens who fully participate in society.47
Bari asserts further that British Muslims have a very strong loyalty to Britain compared to
Muslims living in other European nations. This is partially substantiated by the Open
Society Institute Report “Muslims in Europe: A Report of 11 EU Cities”.48 Research
in 11 European cities with high levels of Muslim settlement revealed that 82.4% of
Muslims in the City of Leicester49 (the highest of any city in the study) and 72% of
Muslims in Waltham Forest identified themselves as British. The next highest was the
Dutch city of Amsterdamwith 59% identifying themselves as Dutch. States that deny citi-
zenship to their Muslim citizens had comparatively much lower scores. The German
cities of Berlin with 25% and Hamburg with 22% are examples of this.
The topic of British Muslim loyalty has come firmly to the fore post-September 11,
2001. Numerous media sources have broken stories that up to 4000 British Muslims
have assisted the Taliban in Afghanistan, often directly assisting them against British sol-
diers.50 However it was the actions of British-born and raisedMuslims in carrying out the
July 7, 2005 London bombings, killing 52 and injuring scores more that brought public
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scrutiny and questions about loyalty to the country to new levels. The response of the
MCB has been pivotal in affirming the loyalty of British Muslims to the state in a
climate marked by deep suspicion and distrust. On the day of the 7/7 attacks the MCB
released a statement “utterly” condemning the terrorist acts, labeling them evil, extend-
ing prayers and sympathies to the victims, and extending “support and gratitude” to the
emergency services, police and frontlines services.51 The MCB have marked the anniver-
sary of the attacks ever since and consistently affirmed the loyalty of British Muslims.
Speaking at the five-year anniversary of the attacks, current Secretary General Farooq
Murad stated that the MCB “recognise that our community must remain vigilant and
steadfast against those who commit such acts in the name of Islam and thus pervert
our faith for their own ends”.52 Murad then committed the MCB to combating extre-
mism and working towards open, liberal society.
In January 2007 the MCB released a particularly important document detailing “Our
Stand on Multiculturalism, Citizenship, Extremism, & Expectations from the Commission on
Integration and Cohesion”, affirming its loyalty and commitment to the multicultural
state. This briefing paper outlined the MCB’s multicultural vision:
The MCB’s vision is of a multi-faith, pluralist society with a conscious policy of
recognizing that people’s cultural and faith identities are not merely a private
matter but have public implications. This does not imply cultural separatism
—the MCB is committed to engagement and working for the common good.53
This same document challenges the notion “that Muslim communities are inherently
self-segregating”,54 asserting no factual basis for such a claim and that it is “possible to
pursue both the vision of a multicultural Britain and fulfill the responsibilities of active
citizenship”.55 In line with the concept of “active citizenship” the MCB have achieved
numerous successes on behalf of their constituents including working with other religious
groups towards the creation of the Religious Discrimination Act (2005); maintaining
grants for Muslim faith schools equal to other faith-based schools; and the creation of
Shariah compliant finance systems. Additionally the MCB have sought to influence the
British Government on foreign policy issues including their country’s role in Afghani-
stan56 and Iraq57 and more recently called on the UK Foreign Secretary to condemn
the Israeli military action against the Gaza Flotilla.58
It is clear the Muslim Council of Britain clearly believes in and supports multicultur-
alism and the wider state apparatus with which it is entwined as long as it treats them with
equal value and respect in the public sphere and allows them the opportunity to represent
and advocate for Muslim communities. TheMCB has benefited from the policy of multi-
culturalism and is among its ardent advocates.
The Islamic Council of Victoria
The Islamic Council of Victoria (ICV) is the peak body for Muslim organizations in the
State of Victoria, Australia, representing over 90,000 of the state’s 110,000 Muslims
through 37 affiliated member organizations throughout the state. The ICV Vision is to
“build a better community for all Australians through the empowerment of Muslims in
Victoria”.59 This affirmative statement immediately situates the ICV within the structures
and bounds of wider Australian political institutional frameworks.
The Islamic Council of Victoria has emerged as the pre-eminent representative body in
the country in achieving substantive and positive engagement in their constituent and the
wider community. The Council has been proactive in defending the rights of Victoria’s
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Muslim communities, filing and then following through with a complaint against the Salt
Shakers Church in 2002 for alleged vilification of Muslims, utilizing the Racial and Reli-
gious Tolerance Act (2001) and speaking out strongly against counter-terrorism laws.
The ICV has also focused on engaging with Muslims, particularly young Australian
Muslims. Two women currently occupy the Vice President and Secretary roles and pro-
minent young Muslim men including Nazeem Hussein (comedian), Hyder Gulam
(lawyer and former Royal Australian Air Force Officer) and Saeed Saeed (freelance jour-
nalist) are all elected members of the leadership team. The ICV have also instituted, in
cooperation with the La Trobe University Centre for Dialogue, (funded by both State
and Federal governments) a seven-week Leadership Training Program for young
Muslim Australians that seeks to “empower young Muslim men and women to reach
their full potential as citizens and future leaders”60 and to “develop the skills that
young Muslims need to engage confidently and creatively with all levels of government,
business, academia, the professional world, the media and religious and community
organisations”.61 It is immediately clear that the Islamic Council of Victoria at the leader-
ship level has an appreciation of the core components of cultural capital that will aid
young Muslim Australians in succeeding in various aspects of wider community life.
Importantly, the ICV has acted as a buffer between more extreme elements of Muslim
communities and wider Australia, on occasion filtering unreasonable claims from con-
stituents. Former ICV Media spokesperson Waleed Aly states:
…the thread that has been consistent is that it has sought to be a constructive
presence… a contribution to society that contributes something positive and
introduced a perspective that perhaps is missing, that stands up for its constitu-
ency when necessary and when legitimate, but doesn’t want to be seen merely to
be a ministry of whinging.62
In a recent interview ICV President Ramzi Elsayed stated that the ICV strongly
supports multiculturalism and want the Muslim community to play its part, asserting
that symbolically and practically, Muslims have to be part of the solution to providing
order and safety in the Victorian community.63 Additionally, Elsayed has worked to
establish links with other religious representative organizations that may aid in ensur-
ing the safety of Australian Muslims in the event of a terrorist action backlash. It is
perceived that these figures would publically support the Muslim community and
speak out against violence. Importantly, on the question of loyalty, Elsayed invokes
an implicit social contract that governs the political attitude of Muslims in the
West. As long as the Australian Government and the State machinery offer Muslims
freedom and protection to practice their faith, it is incumbent on Muslims to recipro-
cate and show loyalty and commitment to Australia. For him there is simply no other
way: “there is nothing for you to do but to give loyalty… we have an obligation to reci-
procate that”.64
Importantly, the President of the ICV was very aware of accusations that the organiz-
ation was “too moderate” and has worked actively with more conservative Muslim organ-
izations to include them in decision making processes and community engagement,
whilst listing several areas where the organization has advocated for Muslim communities
and been critical of the government including the topic of Indian student attacks65 and
the refugee debate.66 Such critique has been within the spectrum of constructive engage-
ment with the state and within the context of civil society. The ICV, as does the MCB,
benefits from multiculturalism and is a strong supporter of it.
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Constructive Engagement: “Moderate Muslims”
Many Muslim citizens of Australia and the UK work hard to break down stereotypes and
assert a positive role for Islam and Muslims in the Western social landscape. In academic
and now political discourse, these actors are often referred to as “moderate” Muslims.
But the mention of the concept of the “moderate”Muslim raises considerable conjecture
amongst politically active Muslims. Those that may be considered to fall within its gamut
are quick to challenge the application of the term stating that Islam is by definition the
“middle path”67 whilst those critical of “moderates” are quick to condemn the form of
engagement they undertake, often on the basis that this is somehow “selling out”
Islamic values. This article asserts that the term is both suitable and durable although
it must be qualified and its margins defined.
Two of the more substantive recent explorations of the concept “moderate” come from
John Esposito, and Tariq Modood and Fauzia Ahmed. Esposito has highlighted the con-
tentious nature of the term and the way that it has been utilized by politicians:
Too often, for non-Muslims and Muslims alike, “moderate” Muslims are
played off against “fundamentalist” Muslims; fundamentalism is simply
equated with religious extremism and terrorism. In an even more restrictive
usage, a “moderate” Muslim is defined as someone “just like us”. Thus, for
many Western secularists, moderate Muslims are those who advocate secular
liberalism. Conservative or traditionalist Muslims are regarded as fundamental-
ists: theologically close minded, suspicious, or extreme.68
Modood and Ahmed agree that the term “moderate” is relative and “only makes sense in
terms of a contrast with non-moderates”.69 However, they assert that “moderate
Muslim” is a relational concept in another deeper sense. It is the relations between
Muslims and the “West” that provides the necessary backdrop to the understanding
“moderate” Muslim identity:
Moderate Muslims in the British or any other Western context, seek, albeit in
different ways, positive mutual interaction between things Western and things
Islamic, including socio-political integration and self integration, that is, inte-
grating aspects of thinking that are Muslim and aspects of one’s thinking that
are Western, so there is no clear boundary or antagonism between the two…
The idea of reconciling two sets of intellectual-practical commitments,
holding onto one without rejecting the other but seeking to make compatible
the best from both and to do so as a form of politics, is central to the concept
of “moderate Muslim”.70
It must be acknowledged that the term “moderate” is imposed from outside the religion
as a political categorization. The concept must be understood as an active political pos-
ition that emphasizesMuslim identity in the public sphere. This differentiates the concept
from mainstream cultural Muslims for whom religion is a less active and assertive marker
of identity. Moderate Muslims utilize their often extensive community and public stand-
ing to express this identity in the civic realm, often through legal and structural mechan-
isms. Moderate Muslims work politically within, not violently outside the system to
achieve change. The third important attribute is based on the concept of “engagement”.
Moderate Muslims are committed to dialogue with both other Muslims and non-
Muslims and open to an exchange of ideas even when these ideas do not coincide with
their own views. This may be considered by moderate Muslims to constitute “da’wah”
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(invitation to Islam) and is simultaneously a core principle of modern democratic practice
and pluralism whereby the individual may be persuaded by the strength of argument.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, moderate Muslims may be understood as con-
sciously articulating a stake in the future success of the nation (upon the basis that free
practice of Islam in Australia or the UK is greater than that in many Islamic nations)
with success defined by a continuation (and even improvement) of democratic practice
and future prosperity.
Limitations of the Moderate Approach
The greatest single issue facing moderate Muslims and those working with them from a
Government policy and media perspective is their level of legitimacy and political cur-
rency in the eyes of the wider Muslim communities. Given the highly diverse nature of
Muslim communities in Western contexts it must be understood that it is well nigh
impossible for one Muslim voice to represent the hopes and aspirations of all Muslims
as a collective entity.71 As Waleed Aly has remarked, the “entity called the ‘Australian
Muslim community’, that so regularly makes an appearance in the Australian public con-
versation is in fact a horrible political fiction”.72 This is similarly the case in Britain where
close to two million Muslims from diverse backgrounds are often essentialized and per-
ceived as a singular community. Those Muslims who manage to gain public prominence
through media engagement and involvement in a range of advisory roles for government
agencies have to contend with mistrust and suspicion. The extreme right view moderate
Muslims as a “Trojan horse” for a more radical Islamic agenda. Their declared loyalty to
the state and nation is deemed to be a lie. Instead they are accused of harboring a hidden
Islamic agenda. At the other extreme, Islamists reject moderate Muslims for displaying
loyalty to the secular state over and above Islam. At the very core of these criticisms
are accusations surrounding the authenticity of their identity. This is in many ways
central to understanding the polemical nature of the debate. Extreme views on both
sides regard identity to be pure and unadulterated. Dismissing the hybrid nature of iden-
tity and the porous borders of self, they dismiss moderate Muslims who seek to build
bridges between Muslims and the broader community as disingenuous and subversive—
either to Islam or to secularism. Islamophobes and Islamists share a common ground in
relation to moderate Muslims: they are seen as inauthentic.
ModerateMuslim representative organizations in theWest face the difficult prospect of
reconciling competing tensions within their diverse communities based on ethnic, cul-
tural and spiritual grounds whilst seeking to promote a cohesive “united front”. For mod-
erate Muslim organizations a key challenge lies in maintaining legitimacy in the face of
objections from the more hardline margins which could echo the Islamist perspective,
whilst acting in the best interest of their constituents.
The key limitation to moderate Muslims is evident in the balance that they must show
between representing the interests of their broad base of constituent members to achieve
positive outcomes, whilst working within the existing political framework. A prime
example of the delicate line that moderate Muslims must walk was evident with regard
to the enactment of counter-terrorism laws in Australia following the London 7/7 bomb-
ings. Australian Muslim communities overwhelmingly felt that such proposed laws were
specifically focused on Muslims. Forced through Federal Parliament with minimal con-
sultation and scrutiny, the onlyMuslim body to even be briefed on the laws was the highly
selective Federal Government picked Muslim Community Reference Group (MCRG).
Shortly after the briefing, Chairman Ameer Ali (then President of the Australian
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Federation of Islamic Councils) stated his support for the laws,73 only to be quickly
challenged by other Muslim representative bodies. This criticism not only undermined
the MCRG (a body already under considerable attack from Australian Muslims for its
non-representative nature), it highlighted the risk of being co-opted by the Government.
This is a serious potential pitfall for moderate Muslim organizations as they seek to
engage the broad community and government agencies; they could weaken their
support-base among the Muslim grass roots.
Cultural Muslims—The Silent Majority
The growing body of literature on Islam in the West has generally neglected a large
portion of the Muslim population. The inevitable focus on Muslim organizations has
come at the expense of those who are not mobilized under the banner of their faith. It
should not come as a surprise that religion is not the primary source of identity for
many Muslims. Other sources, most commonly ethnic, may provide an equal or
greater well-spring of self-identification. Ethnic identities are in fact assumed to be the
many parts that make up the jigsaw of multicultural societies in Australia and the UK.
The secular paradigm within which multiculturalism was conceived is focused upon pro-
viding a public space for the articulation and development of ethnic identities. Religion
was not seen as the critical feature. Many ethnic Muslim groups benefited from this
approach and flourished in the framework of multiculturalism. Ethnic Muslim commu-
nities did not of course discard Islam. As a matter of fact Islam has remained an integral
part of ethnic identity. But for this category of Muslims, Islam is not the sole source of
identity. This category may be loosely called cultural Muslims—those who define them-
selves asMuslim because they are born into aMuslim family and are proud of this Islamic
heritage but do not actively follow Islamic principles. Cultural Muslims often have a prag-
matic approach to religion. Islam is celebrated when it helps consolidate community but
is not allowed to interfere and interrupt the daily routine of life which may be called
secular for all intents and purposes.
Because of the very nature of cultural Muslims, it is difficult to have an accurate esti-
mation of their size in comparison with practicing Muslims. They do not form organiz-
ations with “cultural Muslim” in their title; the national censuses of Australia and the
UK do not ask about the level of religiosity. The ICV President Ramzi ElSayyed estimates
only 30% of Australian Muslims to be practicing their faith.74 This means a rough esti-
mate of 70% of Muslims, or 250,000 are a silent majority whose views are not immedi-
ately sought in the public discourse on Islam. Cultural Muslims are not represented in the
various Islamic organizations that purport to stand for Muslim interests. They are not
invited by various government agencies to provide “community” feedback on policy. It
is as if they are invisible. Cultural Muslims go about their daily lives without making a
fuss about religion and because of that, they are ignored when it comes to debating
Islam in the West.
Michael Humphrey has noted that government bodies look to representative bodies for
community consultation.75 This is a practical consideration and has allowed the reli-
giously-inspired organizations to speak for Muslim interests. Once again the Prime Min-
ister’s Muslim Community Reference Group serves as an example of this potentially
flawed approach. Muslims of Turkish heritage were excluded entirely from the reference
group. Turkish-born Muslims constitute Australia’s second largest foreign-born Muslim
group (behind Lebanese Muslims)76 whilst many more Australian-born Muslims share
Turkish cultural heritage. It appears that in the context of an overarching concern with
320 Shahram Akbarzadeh and Joshua M. Roose
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 O
f M
elb
ou
rn
e] 
at 
19
:32
 20
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
1 
security and preventing terrorism, Australian Turks were overlooked for engagement due
to the perception that their practice and interpretation of Islam was less political and
“dangerous” than other Muslims. In this context it seemed advantageous for those
seeking to gain Government attention and to make claims to be overtly political.
However, an important voice in the process of engagement was not heard.
An unintended consequence of this process is the disenfranchisement of a large section
of the Muslim population. In the context of growing unease about Muslim loyalties and
security considerations, this process has further muffled the voice of cultural Muslims.
Caught between those that claim that Islam is the religion of Jihad and those that claim
that Islam is a religion of peace and understanding, it is hard to hear those who
present Islam as a component of their identity with no outward manifestations.
It is unclear what mechanisms could offer the silent majority within the minority com-
munity a voice, but it is imperative that alternative approaches are tested. Continuing on
this trajectory of recognizing religious Muslims as representative of Muslim interests
leads to a simplistic picture, that ignores the dynamic and evolving nature of (Muslim)
identity. More importantly, such an approach confers an unwarranted amount of legiti-
macy onto a minority voice.
Conclusion
The fast pace of social events and the problematization ofMuslim identity in thewake of ter-
rorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in theUnited States and 7 July 2005 in theUKhave pre-
sentedMuslims in the West with difficult questions. In the pre-September 11 era, issues of
socio-economic integration dominated the literature on Muslim communities. There has
been a large body of academic and policy-related literature on problems surrounding
SouthAsian communities in theUKor theTurkish andLebanese communities inAustralia.
Unemployment, wealth disparity, and educational achievements were the dominant issues
of concern. But the emergence of terrorist activity among theMuslimpopulation of theWest
has elevated the question of socio-economic integration into an existential one. Now, the
issue is no longer about the reasons explaining wealth disparity between Muslims and the
rest of the society, but the threat that Islam poses to the Western way of life.
The heightened sense of unease concerning the place of Islam in the West has put
Muslims on the back foot. All of a sudden, Muslims feel an overbearing pressure to
condemn terrorism and pledge loyalty to the state of their residence/citizenship. At the
same time, the public scrutiny of Islam has offered the moderate Muslim leadership an
opportunity to advance a version of Islam that is modern, tolerant and aligned with the
rule of law in the West. In articulating Muslim loyalty to the state, the moderate leader-
ship has found the multicultural system very useful on two key counts. It allows Muslim
leaders to express their views publicly, reiterate Muslims’ commitment to social harmony
and criticize aspects of government policy or public discourse that they find harmful. At
the same time, these leaders can “defend” Islam and maintain their position among their
communities. In other words, declaring loyalty to Australia does not necessarily have to
come at the expense of religious belief, as the policy of multiculturalism allows for cul-
tural/religious autonomy within the framework of civic citizenship. This flexibility is
good for Muslim organizations, making moderate Muslims amongst the most ardent
defenders of multiculturalism.
The debate on the role of Islam in the West and the subsequent assertiveness of mod-
erate Muslim leadership, however, have tended to come at the expense of the public visi-
bility of non-religious Muslims who identify themselves through their ethnic identity.
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Cultural Muslims who tend to congregate in ethnic organizations now face difficult ques-
tions about the extent of their “Muslimness”. The more pious moderate Muslims speak
in defense of Islam in the public domain, and the government agencies turn to such
spokespersons to seek advice on Muslim issues, the cultural Muslims are marginalized.
This is a self-perpetuating process that undermines the credibility of cultural Muslims
as “true Muslims” in the public eye and reserves the title for the exclusive use of the reli-
giously-inclined.
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